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Israel's Air Strike upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor; Editorial Comment, by Anthony 
D’Amato*, 77 American Journal of International Law, pp. 584-588 (1983) 
Abstract:  The destructive potential of nuclear weapons is so enormous as to call into question any and all received 
rules of international law regarding the trans-boundary use of force. Many of the old rationales for these rules no 
longer apply. At the same time, the shared values underlying the rules apply more emphatically than ever, for the 
stake is global survival. I have tried to suggest some of the questions that must be asked about as apparently 
“simple” an incident as the Israeli attack on the nuclear reactor in Iraq. 
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 [pg584]** It is curious that no commentary has appeared in this Journal regarding 
Israel's aerial strike upon the Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad on the morning of June 7, 1981. 
Perhaps scholarly consensus accords simply with the Security Council resolution of June 19, 
1981, which “strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of 
the United Nations and the norms of international conduct.”FN1 My limited purpose here is to 
suggest questions regarding any such simple conclusion, and to invite detailed and considered 
scholarly analysis of the situation.FN2 
 The starting point for any legal analysis is Article 2(4) of the Charter.FN3 Was Israel's 
unannounced, premeditated aerial bombardment of the Iraqi reactor a “use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence” of Iraq? On what Professor Julius Stone has called 
the “extreme” view of 2(4), any unilateral employment of transboundary force not in self-defense 
against [pg585] an armed attack (Article 51) violates 2(4).FN4 But as Stone goes on to argue, 
this reading—though it commands some support in the travaux preparatoires—ignores the terms 
“territorial integrity” and “political independence.” FN5  
 
 I suggest that it is open to serious question whether Israel's strike was a use of force 
against either Iraq's territorial integrity or its political independence. No portion of Iraq's territory 
was taken away from Iraq by the bombardment. A use of the territory—namely, to construct a 
nuclear reactor—was interfered with, but the territory itself remained integral. Nor was Iraq's 
political independence compromised. Iraq's power was undoubtedly lessened, but in what sense 
was its governmental authority vis-a-vis other sovereign governments diminished? Of course, if 
Israel's attack had been preliminary to a military campaign directed against Iraq's territorial 
integrity or political independence, a purposive interpretation of Article 2(4) would result in a 
finding of illegality of the initial strike against the nuclear reactor. But there has been no 
evidence of any Israeli purpose beyond the limited one of destroying the nuclear reactor itself. In 
this respect, Israel's action was analogous to a limited “humanitarian intervention,” such as the 
Entebbe raid,FN6 which can be justified along similar lines as not violative of 2(4).FN7 
 
 But there is another component to Article 2(4)—that the use of force must not be 
“inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Here a purposive, or teleological, inquiry 
is explicitly mandated. McDougal and Feliciano, although addressing themselves to self-defense 
under the Charter, suggest three relevant factors for determining the objectives of the claimant 
(here, Israel): extension or conservation, degree of consequentiality, and exclusivity or 




 As McDougal and Feliciano put it, the question of extension or conservation of values is 
whether Israel intended to conserve its own values rather than extend them “through acquiring or 
destroying values held by the opposing participant [Iraq].”FN9 In one sense, Israel's action was 
profoundly conservative: to check possible nuclear proliferation to a regime perceived as 
unstable or irresponsible. However, having its own nuclear reactor was clearly a value for Iraq. 
Was Israel's action “therapeutic” in McDougal's viewFN10—to remove an enemy's potential for 
aggression? The difficulty of answering this question leads to McDougal's qualification that a 
“therapeutic” attack should be “exercisable only by, or under an unambiguous authorization 
from, the entire community.”FN11 Yet this qualification is clearly too strong; it swamps [pg586] 
McDougal's own factor for analytical purposes. For it is often politically expedient for the 
community to condemn a forceful initiative in explicit terms, yet to approve of it in fact by 
stopping short of reprisals against the initiator. There is a subtle interplay of politics and 
acquiescence that renders any demand for “unambiguous authorization” unrealistic. The very 
resolution condemning Israel's aerial strike fell noticeably short of imposing any penalty or 
sanction against Israel.FN12 
 
 With respect to the degree of consequentiality of the values asserted by Israel, there is 
hardly a more fundamentally important value than the preservation of the lives of the inhabitants 
of the claimant state. If Iraq were to develop a nuclear weapons capability, the existence of a 
small state such as Israel would be in jeopardy. In other words, Israel may have been justified in 
attacking a nuclear reactor in Iraq, where it would not have been justified in attacking a plant that 
manufactured tanks or conventional artillery, because of the enormous destructive potential of 
nuclear weapons. Does not any consequentialist perspective require drawing a qualitative line 
between conventional and nuclear capabilities insofar as an interpretation of Article 2(4) is 
concerned? 
 
 The third factor suggested by McDougal and Feliciano is the exclusivity or inclusivity of 
Israel's objectives. Professor Thomas Mallison and Ms. Sally Mallison cite the following 
statement by Prime Minister Begin of Israel in support of their contention that Israel appeared to 
have acted solely for its own perceived values: “I don't care about the Arab world. I care about 
our lives.”FN13 Yet can Begin's statement fairly be read as ruling out any other motivation? 
Even if it could, is it not possible that a state acting for its own interests could still be carrying 
out inclusive community interests? If so, what are those interests, and how do they relate to the 
purposes of the United Nations? 
 
 One of the purposes of the United Nations, stated to be a proper concern of the General 
Assembly, is “disarmament and the regulation of armaments” (Article 11). Armaments are again 
mentioned in the responsibilities of the Security Council: to “promote the establishment and 
maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments” (Article 
26). Apart from the Charter itself, it is clear that the proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes 
one of the gravest threats that has ever faced mankind. Given the fact that nuclear weapons 
cannot be dis-invented, international stability is compromised each time a new government 
acquires them. The confusion and chaos that would inevitably accompany any aggressive use of 
nuclear weapons might rapidly escalate into an unintended war of human extinction. Although 
Israel's unilateral, military, and self-interested aerial attack [pg587] on the Iraqi reactor is hardly 
a peaceful or desirable precedent for the purposes of nonproliferation, it is possible to surmise 
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that the community of nations breathed a little easier after the deed was done. At the time of the 
attack, Iraq was engaged in a premeditated war of aggression against its neighbor Iran.FN14 Is it 
not arguable that Israel was acting on behalf of inclusive community values in frustrating Iraq's 
desire for its own nuclear capability? 
 
 To be sure, at least two contentions can be made against the claim that Israel was acting 
on behalf of inclusive interests. First, one might argue that Israel acted simply to preserve its own 
nuclear hegemony in the Middle East, and thus retain its aggressive posture against its Arab 
neighbors. However, this argument, even if true, simply restates the position that Israel acted out 
of self-interest; it does not defeat the claim that such action served to promote inclusive interests. 
 
 Second, Iraq is a party to the Non-Proliferation TreatyFN15 and has had its nuclear 
installations inspected on a regular basis by the International Atomic Energy Agency, whereas 
Israel has refused to place its own nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. FN16 May we 
conclude that Iraq's nuclear reactor was in compliance with Iraq's “inalienable right . . . to 
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” as stated in 
Article IV of the NPT? The question, of course, is whether IAEA inspection of the facility will 
continue to be frequent and thorough enough to prevent diversion of fissionable material 
produced by the reactor to military uses. Clearly, Israel was not convinced. Indeed, is it 
unreasonable to think that Iraq, or any nation building a nuclear reactor under IAEA safeguards, 
may at some point bar the inspection team and announce to the world that it has successfully 
transferred its fissionable material to its weapons program? What is to prevent clandestine 
transfer at times when the IAEA inspection team is not present or its attention is diverted? 
Finally, the building of an indigenous nuclear reactor is of inestimable educational value to 
government scientists who may be sharpening their expertise for the purpose of developing 
nuclear weaponry. These considerations suggest that the “right” to develop nuclear energy “for 
peaceful purposes” may be self-defeating, and that Israel's action may be the precursor of a 
wholesale revaluation of the NPT and the IAEA program. But even if no such revaluation takes 
place, is it not clear that there is at least a substantial basis for Israel's frontal challenge to the 
NPT-IAEA system? 
 
 I have not dealt with Israel's own purported legal justification for its aerial strike: 
anticipatory self-defense.[FN17] How can this be reconciled with Article 51 [pg588] of the 
Charter, which only allows self-defense “if an armed attack occurs”?FN18 There were claims at 
the time of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 that the United States quarantine was similarly based 
upon Article 51 FN19 but neither have those claimants in 1962 nor has Israel in 1981 
convincingly shown that such a reading of Article 51 would not render it meaningless and in fact 
open the door to aggression. In particular, we may anticipate that someday tensions between the 
Soviet Union and the United States may be so high that the only security either nation will have 
against a war of annihilation will be the clear legal rule prohibiting anticipatory self-defense. 
FN20 
 
 The destructive potential of nuclear weapons is so enormous as to call into question any 
and all received rules of international law regarding the trans-boundary use of force. Many of the 
old rationales for these rules no longer apply. At the same time, the shared values underlying the 
rules apply more emphatically than ever, for the stake is global survival. I have tried to suggest 
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some of the questions that must be asked about as apparently “simple” an incident as the Israeli 
attack on the nuclear reactor in Iraq. I have also made assertions that, if not convincing, I hope 
may have heuristic value. I would welcome debate on this question, and analysis in more detail 
than the sketchy overview given here. 
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